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In the years since the Supreme Court decided Trump v. Hawaii,1 federal district
courts have adjudicated dozens of rights-based challenges to executive action in
immigration law.2 Plaintiffs, including U.S. citizens, civil rights organizations, and

immigrants themselves, have alleged violations of the First Amendment and the equal
protection component of the Due Process Clause with some regularity based on
President Trump's animus toward immigrants.3 This Article assesses Hawaii's impact on these challenges to immigration policy, and it offers two observations. First,

Hawaii has amplified federal courts' practice of privileging administrative law claims
over constitutional ones. For example, courts considering separate challenges to the
travel ban waiver process and the mass-rescission of humanitarianparole concluded
that plaintiffs had not stated constitutional claims under Hawaii's "circumscribed
inquiry," but these courts remainedreceptive to plaintiffs' claims that an agency vio-

lated its obligation to provide a reasoned justification, consider reliance interests,
explain itself sufficiently, or follow its own procedures. 4 Second, Hawaii has prompted
district courts to engage more deeply with the notion that different classes of immigrants are entitled to different levels of constitutional protection. This more open
discussion ofthe contours ofimmigrants' rights acknowledges immigrants as potential

rights-holders but ultimately exposes the limits of a rights-based approach to protecting immigrants' well-being.

* Assistant Professor of Law, University ofAlabama School ofLaw. I am grateful to the
William & Mary Bill ofRights Journal for inviting me to participate in its symposium on "The
Presidency and Individual Rights." Ashley Binnetti Armstrong, Eisha Jain, and Jennifer Lee
Koh provided valuable feedback on earlier drafts; I benefitted from a conversation about this

project with Sam Spital as well. Finally, I thank Jorge Solis (UA Law Class of 2019), Miranda
Ronnow (UA Law Class of 2020), and Josephine Rykhus (UA Law Class of 2021) for excellent research assistance.

138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
See, e.g., Alharbi v. Miller, 368 F. Supp. 3d 527,540 (E.D.N.Y. 2019); Emami v. Nielsen,
365 F. Supp. 3d 1009, 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2019); NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209, 215-16
(D.D.C. 2018), aff'dsub nom. Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140
S. Ct. 1891 (2020); Vidal v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401, 406-07 (E.D.N.Y. 2018), vacated
sub nom. Regents, 140 S. Ct. 1891.
' See generallyAlharbi, 368 F. Supp. 3d 527; Emami, 365 F. Supp. 3d 1009; NAACP
v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209; Vidal, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401.
4 See, e.g., S.A. v. Trump, 363 F. Supp. 3d 1048, 1093 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
5 See, e.g., Ramos v. Nielsen (Ramos 1), 336 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1105, 1107 (N.D. Cal.
2018), vacatedsub nom. Ramos v. Wolf (RamosIi), 975 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2020).
2
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INTRODUCTION

The Trump Administration has altered immigration law profoundly in just a few

years. Through Executive Orders (EOs) and Proclamations, as well as agency action,
the administration has intensified deportations, crippled the asylum system, and cut
legal immigration.' Immigrants and their allies have challenged these policies in

federal court, providing a window into how the federal courts adjudicate immigrants'
rights in numerous cases. The Supreme Court's 2018 decision in Trump v. Hawaii,
which allowed the third version of the administration's travel ban on nationals from
seven majority-Muslim countries to go into effect,7 offers an example of judicial
review of executive action in immigration law. For this symposium on "The Presidency and Individual Rights," I consider the implications of Trump v. Hawaii for

rights-based challenges to executive action in immigration law.
Immigrants have seldom succeeded onrace-based equal protection claims challenging statutes or regulations, but these losses have often been attributed to the lack of
evidence of discriminatory intent.' In the challenges considered in this Article, however, plaintiffs alleged or provided direct evidence of discriminatory intent based on
Trump's anti-Muslim, anti-Mexican, and anti-Black rhetoric. 9 Despite these specific

allegations and this direct evidence, courts have been, nonetheless, exceedingly
reluctant to acknowledge immigrants' equal protection rights. 10 Instead, they have
been much more willing to grant preliminary relief or deny motions to dismiss on
ordinary administrative law claims." The persistence ofthis trend, despite plaintiffs'

extensive direct evidence of discriminatory intent, calls for analysis, one that this
Article undertakes.
6 See, e.g., Proclamation No. 9984, 85 Fed. Reg. 6,709, 6,710 (Jan. 31,2020); Proclamation
No. 9983, 85 Fed. Reg. 6,699, 6,703-05 (Jan. 31, 2020); Proclamation No. 9945, 84 Fed.
Reg. 53,991, 53,992 (Oct. 4,2019); Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161, 45,161-62
(Sept. 24, 2017).
138 S. Ct. 2392, 2400, 2403 (2018).

' Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others:Legal Claims andImmigrationOutside the

Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1735 (2010).
9 Ibram X. Kendi, Is This the Beginning of the End ofAmerican Racism?, ATLANTIC
(Sept. 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/09/the-end-of-denial/614
194/ [https://perma.cc/4HUE-NWFV] (chronicling Donald Trump's racism).
10

See, e.g., Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891,

1915-16 (2020) (rejecting plaintiffs' equal protection challenge to the rescission of DACA).
For a discussion offederal courts' practice of overlooking explicit bias in antidiscrimination
cases and other areas, including immigration, see Jessica A. Clarke, Explicit Bias, 113 Nw.

U. L. REV. 505, 510 (2018).
" See Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1915 (determining that DHS's rescission ofDACA was arbitrary and capricious). For a discussion of the relative success of ordinary administrative law
claims over equal protection claims brought by noncitizens prior to Hawaii, see Geoffrey
Heeren, Persons Who Are Not the People: The ChangingRights oflmmigrants in the United

States, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 367, 398 (2013).
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This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explains the 2017 travel bans and the
Supreme Court's decision in 2018 allowing a version of the travel ban to go into
effect. It also lays out the standard of review under the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA). Part II explores how the federal district courts have applied Trump v.
Hawaii in a range of cases, from the ongoing travel ban litigation to challenges to
the termination of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) and the rescission of humanitarian parole. Part III offers a few thoughts on the emerging lessons of Hawaii for
immigrants' rights litigation generally.
I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORKS OF TRUMP V. HA WAII AND THE APA
Congress has plenary power to regulate the grounds for admission into and
removal from the United States, but the President's role in immigration law has
garnered increasing attention in recent years. 13 Since its earliest days, the Trump
Administration has worked to restrict all forms of immigration, legal and extralegal,

whether through family, employment, or humanitarian channels. 4 Its use of executive orders and proclamations have struck commentators as "unorthodox."" Because
the President is not an agency, his actions are not "final agency action" reviewable

under the APA. 16 But the administration has frequently implemented its policies
through agency action. Accordingly, this Part discusses the legal framework articulated in Trump v. Hawaiias well as the APA's framework for reviewing ordinary
administrative law claims.
A. Trump v. Hawaii

Litigation over the 2017 travel bans culminated in the Supreme Court's decision
in Trump v. Hawaii.17 As discussed in this Article, the "travel ban" refers to the series
of entry bans issued beginning just after the inauguration," which barred entry of
foreign nationals initially from several majority-Muslim countries and then later
North Korea and Venezuela as well." Trump's relentless campaign against Muslim
12

Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 599-600 (1889).

13 See generallyAdam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The PresidentandImmigration

Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458 (2009).
14 See generally, e.g., id; Sarah Pierce & Jessica Bolter, DismantlingandReconstructing
the US. ImmigrationSystem: A Catalogof Changes Under the Trump Presidency,MIGRATION
POL'Y INST. 1 (July 2020), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications

/MPI_US-Immigration-Trump-Presidency-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/2N26-QPTW].
1 Michele Waslin, The Use ofExecutive Orders andProclamationsto CreateImmigration
Policy: Trump in HistoricalPerspective,8 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 54, 54 (2020).
16 Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796 (1992). For a critique of Franklin, see
Kathryn E. Kovacs, Constrainingthe StatutoryPresident, 98 WASH. U. L. REv. 63, 68 (2020).

7 See generally 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
8
19

See Franklin, 505 U.S. at 796.
The administration subsequently issued numerous other entry bans including bans
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immigration led to the "Muslim ban" moniker. 20 The bans separated families21 and

prevented universities from welcoming students and researchers from banned
countries.22 Plaintiffs argued that the President had exceeded his statutory authority
to ban entry of foreign nationals and violated the Establishment Clause by enacting
a law designed to express disapproval of Muslims. 23 Although plaintiffs succeeded

early on, a divided Supreme Court ultimately allowed a revised version ofthe ban
to take effect.24

In Hawaii, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on
their statutory and constitutional challenges to the third iteration ofthe travel ban.25
The third iteration of the ban, framed as a Presidential Proclamation, barred travel
from seven majority-Muslim countries as well as North Korea and Venezuela. 26 It

provided for a waiver procedure in individual cases. 27 It imposed the ban indefinitely. 28 The administration claimed that the ban was designed to enhance national
security, but plaintiffs and the national security community questioned the sincerity
of that purpose.29

In Hawaii, the Court analyzed only the third version of the travel ban. It first
determined that INA section 212(f) authorized the President to broadly restrict
entry. 30 INA section 212(f) states:

Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of
any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental
to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and
for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of
all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants,
relating to health insurance and travel from China amid the COVID-19 pandemic. See Procla-

mation No. 9945, 84 Fed. Reg. 53,991, 53,991-92 (Oct. 4, 2019); Proclamation No. 9984,
85 Fed. Reg. 6,709, 6,710 (Jan. 31, 2020).
20 David J. Bier, A Dozen Times Trump EquatedHis Travel Ban with a Muslim Ban,
CATO INST. (Aug. 14, 2017, 12:06 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/dozen-times-trump
-equated-travel-ban-muslim-ban [https://perma.cc/4AFD-NSFD].

21

Aidan Gardiner, IranianFamiliesDividedby the Trump TravelBan Tell of Holidays

Apart andLiveson Hold, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/20
/reader-center/trump travel ban.html [https://perma.cc/M6BA-D4RE].
22 Mary O'Hara, The U.S. Travel Ban Would Be Bad News for American Universities,

GUARDIAN (Feb. 21, 2017, 2:15 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/education/2017/feb/21
/donald-trump-travel-ban-universities-intemational-students
23
24
25

26
27
28
29
30

[https://perma.cc/N5AN-CHXC].

Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2406 (2018) (describing plaintiffs' claims).
Id. at 2423.
Id
Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161, 45,164 (Sept. 24, 2017).
See, e.g., id at 45,168.
Id. at 45,171.
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2417 (describing plaintiffs' claims).
Id. at 2408.
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or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to
be appropriate. 31
The Court further determined that, under a standard akin to rational basis review,

and on the limited record before the Court, there was likely no Establishment Clause
violation. Specifically, the Court rejected traditional Establishment Clause analysis
that inquires whether the challenged enactment has the "principal or primary effect
of promoting religion . . . [or] if a reasonable, objective observer would view its
purpose as one of endorsing religion."3 2 Under that analysis, plaintiffs would need

only show that a reasonable observer would regard the purpose ofthe travel ban as
showing disapproval of Islam. 33

Instead, the Supreme Court determined that a 1972 case, Kleindienstv. Mandel,3 4
offered the appropriate analytic approach to the question ofthe travel ban's probable

constitutionality. 5 In Mandel,plaintiffs were U.S. universities which sought to bring
a Belgian professor, Ernest Mandel, to the U.S. to address university audiences. 36

Unbeknownst to Mandel, on his previous U.S. visits, the State Department had found
him "inadmissible," but the Attorney General had waived his inadmissibility. 37 This
time, however, the Attorney General declined to waive his inadmissibility, and Mandel
was excluded, prompting the litigation.38 The Court addressed for the first time the
appropriate analytic approach to judicial review of executive exclusion decisions.39

It determined that the executive branch's determination to exclude a noncitizen was
entitled to deference. 40 So long as the Attorney General offered a "facially legitimate
and bona fide reason" for the exclusion, the Court's inquiry was complete. 4 1 The
Court would not pry into the executive's motives to determine if the stated reason
was mere pretext. 42

31 8 U.S.C. § 1182. For an analysis of the legislative history of this provision, see Dan
Ordorica, Note, PresidentialPowerandAmerican Fear:A History ofINA § 212(F), 99 B.U. L.
REv. 1839, 1871-72 (2019) (arguing that Congress intended to authorize the broadest possible
authority to exclude noncitizens but that the judiciary could develop more robust standards
for its exercise).
32 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Tiersfor the EstablishmentClause, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 59,

80 (2017).
3 See id.
34

408 U.S. 753 (1972).

35

40

Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2419.
Mandel, 408 U.S. at 756-57.
Id at 756.
Id at 757-59.
See id. at 768-70.
Id at 770.

41

Id

36

37
38

39

42

Id
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The Court elaborated on this inquiry years later in Kerry v. Din.43 In Din, an

American citizen, Fauzia Din, sought a spousal visa for her husband, Berashk, who
lived in Afghanistan. 44 Berashk was denied the visa, with the State Department
stating only that he was inadmissible under INA section 212(a)(3)(B), a provision
related to terrorism.4 5 It provided no further explanation or supporting facts. 46 The
trial court and Ninth Circuit determined that Din had a constitutional liberty interest
in cohabiting with her husband in the United States and that the State Department's

adjudication, lacking a full explanation of the decision, violated due process. 4 7 A
plurality of Justices disagreed. 48 The Supreme Court held that, even if Din had a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in living with her husband in the U.S., the
procedure used by the State Department did not violate due process.4 9 The State Department had offered a "facially legitimate and bona fide reason" for the denial
specifically, it had cited the INA provision, section 212(a)(3)(B), and it had described
what that provision covered.50 It was not required to further explain what conduct
it believed Berashk had engaged in.51 Thus, Din appears to require as little of the
government as Mandel.
In his concurring opinion, however, Justice Kennedy presented the possibility

ofgreater scrutiny under certain narrow circumstances.52 He observed that "[a]bsent
an affirmative showing of bad faith .. . plausibly alleged with sufficient particularity," the Court would not look further into the adjudicator's decisionmaking. 53 But
what if bad faith abounds? At least one federal court of appeals construed Din as
permitting more searching review where the executive evinces bad faith. 54 But the
Supreme Court rejected this approach in Trump v. Hawaii.55 Instead, the Court emphasized deference to the President and looked to the official statements of purpose
behind the bans ignoring the bevy of public statements evincing racial and religious animus.56

576 U.S. 86 (2015).
44 Id at 88 (plurality opinion).
43

45 Id at 89-90.
46 Id

47 Id at 90.
48

See generally id

49 Id at 101.

See id at 103-04 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
51 See id at 101 (plurality opinion).
50

52 See id at 105 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
5'

See id

54 See, e.g., Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233,264 (4th Cir. 2018)
(describing Din as accounting "for those very rare instances in which a challenger plausibly
alleges that a government action runs so contrary to the basic premises of our Constitution as
to warrant more probing review").

5

138 S. Ct. 2392, 2440 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

56 Id at 2421 (majority opinion).
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In Hawaii, the Court applied Mandel to an exclusion policy rather than a single
exclusion decision.57 It deemed national security to constitute an "independent justification."" Rather than inquiring whether this "facially legitimate reason" was in

fact bona fide, considering the allegations of bad faith, the Court stopped at facial
legitimacy and considered whether any facts on record supportedthe statedjustification. Finding that the administration had conducted a multiagency worldwide
review of vetting protocols, the Court determined that the record contained such
facts. 60 Ultimately, evidence of bad faith had no impact on the Court's analytic
framework. That the Court remained unmoved, despite smoking gun evidence of
animus, has proven to be one of Hawaii's legacies.
Four Justices dissented. 61 Justices Breyer and Kagan began with the premise that

the Proclamation would be unlawful "[i]f its promulgation or content was significantly affected by religious animus against Muslims." 2 In contrast, if its "sole" basis

was national security, it would be lawful. 63 This, in effect, turnedthe majority's test
on its head. Although the majority found plaintiffs unlikely to succeed absent
allegations that religious animus was the sole basis for the Proclamation, Justices
Breyer and Kagan would find the Proclamation unlawful if national security were
not the sole basis. 64
Apart from offering a different framework, these Justices drew inferences from

how the government applied the Proclamation inpractice. Specifically, the Justices
looked to the "elaborate system of exemptions and waivers" for information about
the Proclamation's similarity to or differences from prior presidential orders in immigration law. 65 The Proclamation's system of exemptions and case-by-case waivers,

if available in practice, would bolster its lawfulness. 66 The Justices expressed concern,
however, that the waivers and exemptions were not available even to Muslims who
met "the Proclamation's own security terms." 67 First, the State Department and the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had not issued any guidance for consular

officers to follow when adjudicating requests for waivers or exemptions. 68 Second,
57 See generally id (considering a provision thatgives the President authority to provide
further limitations on entry beyond those in the INA).

58 Id at 2420-21.
9 Id (noting "persuasive evidence that the entry suspension has a legitimate grounding
in national security concerns" but not addressing evidence of animus).
60 Id
at 2421 ("The Proclamation ... reflects the results of a worldwide review process
undertaken by multiple Cabinet officials and their agencies.").
61

See generally id

62

Id

at 2429 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

63 Id
64
65

See id

Id at 2429-30.

66 Id

67 See id at 2430.
68

Idat2431.
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publicly available statistics suggested that the government had granted only a "minuscule percentage" of waivers to those who were likely eligible for them. 69 Finally, the
Justices noted that a consular officer filed an affidavit in pending litigation in federal
district court, indicating that he lacked discretion to grant waivers. 70 If true, the waiver

process would rightly be understood as "mere[] 'window dressing."' 71 Thus, the
Justices sounded a note of caution but called for further proceedings to develop the
facts regarding the operation ofthe waiver process.
Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg, dissenting separately, rejected the majority's

deferential approach to the Proclamation. 72 They concluded that plaintiffs were likely
to succeed on their Establishment Clause claim because a "reasonable observer would
conclude that the Proclamation was motivated by anti-Muslim animus." 73 Reserving

judgment on plaintiffs' "complex statutory claims," the Justices determined that the
constitutional question was "far simpler." 74 The Justices catalogued the President's
anti-Muslim statements on the campaign trail and after the inauguration and chided the
majority for merely "set[ting] them aside" and deferring on national security grounds. 75
The Justices questioned Mandel's applicability, but they determined that even under

Mandel, plaintiffs were likely to succeed based on the Supreme Court's animus jurisprudence. 76 In direct opposition to the majority's conclusion, Justices Sotomayor and
Kagan determined that the Proclamation was "divorced from any factual context

from which we could discern a relationship to legitimate state interests." 77 In addition, they did not regard the multiagency worldwide review as having any cleansing
effect on earlier versions ofthe travel ban. 78Finally, they cautioned that the majority
had made the same mistake that the majority had made in Korematsu rending the
nation's "constitutional fabric" with a "barren invocation of national security." 79

Because plaintiffs in Hawaiiasserted an Establishment Clause claim, but not an
equal protection claim, the Court lacked an opportunity to evaluate the travel ban under
equal protection principles.80 The Supreme Court generally reviews race-based equal
69 Id

70 Id at2432-33.
71 Id (quoting and citing Declaration of Christopher Richardson at 3-4, Alharbi v. Miller,

368 F. Supp. 3d 527 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (No. 1:18-cv-2435)).
72 See id at 2433 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
73 Id
74 dat2434.
75 Id at 2440.
76 Id at 2441-42 (discussing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), and City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)).
77 Id 2440-42 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 635).
78 Id at 2443.
79 Id at 2447-48.
80 Cf Shirin Sinnar & Jayashri Srikantiah, White Nationalismas ImmigrationPolicy, 71
STAN. L. REV. 197 (2019) (arguing that plaintiffs should bring equal protection claims to
challenge white nationalist immigration policies).
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protection challenges to facially neutral laws according to the framework developed
in Village ofArlington Heightsv. MetropolitanHousingDevelopment Corp.81 There,

the Court explained that an "official action will not be held unconstitutional solely
because it results in a racially disproportionate impact." 2 But when a plaintiff has
proof of a discriminatory purpose, deference to the legislature "is no longer justi-

fied." 3 Thus, when a law is facially neutral, the plaintiff must prove that invidious
discrimination played a role, and many factors are probative, including disparate
impact based on race, the historical background ofa decision, procedural or substantive
irregularities, and legislative or administrative history.8 4 The Court further explained
that invidious discrimination need not be the only motive or even the primary motive. 85
Ultimately, plaintiffs had to show that the same decision would not have been made absent invidious discrimination.86 Thus, the Court endorsed a "but-for" motive standard.87
In immigration law, however, the Supreme Court has generally insulated
executive judgments from rights-based challenges. In Reno v. American-ArabAntiDiscriminationCommittee, the Court held that deportable noncitizens who claimed
to have been targeted for deportation based on their political speech and national
origin had no right against selective deportation under the First Amendment because
the executive has prosecutorial discretion.88 Even amidst allegations of discrimination, the Court ruled that the special role of the executive in law enforcement
requires the judiciary to defer to the executive's discretionary judgments. 89 Absent

"'outrageous' ... discrimination," the judiciary lacks authority to review the executive's choice to enforce the law against specific individual offenders."
Similarly, every federal court of appeals to consider an equal protection challenge to a DHS program requiring certain deportable Middle Eastern men to register

with the government rejected that claim." In Rajah v. Mukasey, the Second Circuit
81

429 U.S. 252,265 (1977) (affirming the requirement of"[p]roof ofracially discriminatory

intent or purpose to show a violation ofthe Equal Protection Clause"); see Andrew Verstein,

The JurisprudenceofMixed Motives, 127 YALE L.J. 1106, 1144 (2018).
82 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 264-65.
83 Id at266.
84 See id at 267-68.
85 Id at 265.
86 Id

87 Verstein, supranote 81, at 1144 (discussing Arlington Heights).

88 525 U.S. 471, 489-91 (1999).
89 Id at490.
90

But this doctrine has evolved, and recent judicial decisions have elaborated on the
... discrimination" exception. See Ragbir v. Homan, 923 F.3d 53, 69 (2d Cir.

"'outrageous'

2019) (quoting AADC, 525 U.S. at 488). In Ragbir, the Second Circuit concluded that the
government's targeting of an immigration activist for deportation based on his advocacy
constituted "outrageous" discrimination, permitting judicial review of his claim of selective
deportation. Id
91

Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 439 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Kandamar
v. Gonzales,
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applied only rational basis review to the program based on the government's national
security justification and the noncitizens' deportability.92 Notably, plaintiffs lacked
direct evidence ofpresidential animus there. 93 With existing jurisprudence offering

only limited guidance on the proper analytic framework for equal protection challenges to executive action in immigration law, Hawaiifilled a void.
B. Arbitraryand CapriciousReview Under the APA

Apart from seeking constitutional review, plaintiffs challenging executive action
in immigration law during the Trump Administration have sought review under the

APA. Under section 706(2) of the APA, a reviewing court shall "hold unlawful and
set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse ofdiscretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 94 In its State
Farm decision, the Supreme Court described the arbitrary and capricious standard
as "narrow," but that agency action would be arbitrary and capricious when:
[T]he agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect
of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs
counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible
that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product
of agency expertise.95

Based on SEC v. Chenery Corp., reviewing courts lack the authority to supply
reasoning for a challenged action that the agency has not itself articulated. 96 Decades
later, the Court clarified that an agency that changes a policy need not overcome any
additional hurdle injustification beyond what it would need to for adopting a policy
in the first instance. 97 In FCCv. Fox Television Stations, Inc., the Court ruled that

"it suffices that the new policy is permissible under the statute, that there are good
reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be better, which the conscious
change of course adequately indicates." 98 According to the Court, an agency need
464 F.3d 65, 73-74 (1st Cir. 2006); Ali v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 678, 681 n.4 (5th Cir. 2006);
Zafar v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 461 F.3d 1357, 1367 (11th Cir. 2006).
92 Rajah, 544 F.3d
at 439.
93 Id
94 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).
95 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
96 Id (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)); see Kevin M. Stack, The
ConstitutionalFoundationsofChenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 962 (2007) (noting evolution of
the Chenery rule from applying to adversarial adjudication to applying to informal agency
action as well).
97 See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009).
98

Id
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not do more than consider serious reliance interests created by an earlier policy or
provide an explanation when the agency's factual findings contradict ones support-

ing the earlier policy."
At its core, this standard requires that an agency supply "a reasoned explanation

for its action."100 In Judulangv. Holder, the Supreme Court invalidated, under the
arbitrary and capricious standard, a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) policy

regarding the availability ofdiscretionary relief from removal.101 The Court deemed
arbitrary and capricious the BIA's failure to consider the noncitizen's "fitness to
reside" in the U.S. in determining whether to make discretionary relief available. 10 2
In particular, the Court faulted the BIA for failing to consider factors including, "the
seriousness ofthe offense, evidence of either rehabilitation or recidivism, the duration
of the alien's residence, the impact of deportation on the family, the number of
citizens in the family, and the character of any service in the Armed Forces."10 3 The
Court likened the BIA's policy to distributing relief based on a "coin flip."10 4 As a
result, it was arbitrary and capricious. 10 5
Arbitrary and capricious review under the APA has been routinely characterized
as more stringent than rational basis review, 106 which offers one possible reason why
policies that survive minimal constitutional scrutiny could nonetheless violate the
APA. 107
II.

DISTRICT COURTS APPLY TRUMP V. HA WAII AND THE APA

108

Plaintiffs challenging a range of executive action in immigration law have

asserted both constitutional and administrative law claims. Hawaiihas influenced
the federal courts on questions of immigration law beyond the analysis of entry
99

Id

100 Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 45 (2011).
101 Id
102 Id at 53.
103

Id

at 48 (quoting Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 296 n.5

(2001)).
104 Id

at 56.
105 Id. at 45.
106 See Gillian Metzger, OrdinaryAdministrativeLaw as ConstitutionalCommon Law,

110 COLUM. L. REv. 479, 491 (2010).
107 In addition, the many jurisdiction-stripping provisions ofthe Immigration
and Nationality
Act (INA) removed some agency action from APA review. See JARED P. COLE, CONG. RSCH.
SERV., R44699, AN INTRODUCTION TO JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCY ACTION 1 1-12
(2016). The Supreme Court has held that the APA creates a "presumption ofjudicial review,"
but an agency may defeat this presumption if another statute clearly precludes review. Id
108 For an overview of litigation challenging the Trump Administration's immigration
policies, see generally Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, ImmigrationLitigation in the Time of Trump,

53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 121 (2019).

786

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 29:775

bans. This Part begins with a survey ofrecent litigation in three broad areas: (1) the
exclusion of immigrants not present on U.S. soil; (2) the rescission of status for immi-

grants who have been admitted into the U.S.; and (3) policies directed at immigrants
who have not yet been admitted into the U.S. (whether present on U.S. soil or not). This
range of cases helps showcase the factors that influence courts' analyses of immigrants' constitutional rights claims. This Part also explains how district courts have
treated the ordinary administrative law claims raised by plaintiffs in these cases.
A. Travel Ban & Waiver Litigation

The first set of cases involves ongoing challenges to the travel ban and its
associated waiver procedure. 109 Under the third version of the 2017 travel ban, a

noncitizen whose entry is barred under the ban may seek an individualized waiver."
The Proclamation provides for case-by-case waivers if the consular officer determines that the applicant satisfies three criteria: "(A) denying entry would cause the
foreign national undue hardship; (B) entry would not pose a threat to the national

security or public safety of the United States; and (C) entry would be in the national
interest."i The waiver plays an integral role in the overall ban. In Trump v. Hawaii,
the majority referenced the waiver as evidence of the ban's legitimacy. 1 2
However, the State Department has granted few waivers. As noted above, in their
dissenting opinion in Hawaii, the "minuscule" number of grants prompted Justices
Breyer and Kagan to question the authenticity ofthe waiver process. 1 3 Instead, the

Justices posited that the waiver process could be mere "window dressing" for an
unconstitutional entry ban.1 4 They contended that a sham waiver process would
suggest that animus tainted the entry ban, thus rendering it unconstitutional.1 1 5
Federal district courts have considered separate legal challenges to the waiver
process. In Emami v. Nielsen, plaintiffs brought a class action challenge to the State
109 See Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017); Proclamation No.
9983, 85 Fed. Reg. 6699 (Jan. 31, 2020). On January 31, 2020, the President added six

countries to the list, restricting the issuance of immigrant visas but not nonimmigrant visas.

Proclamation No. 9983, 85 Fed Reg. 6701-02.
10 Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161, 45,168 (Sept. 24, 2017).
1" Id; Letter from Mary K. Waters, Assistant Sec'y for Legis. Affs., U.S. Dep't of State,
to the Hon. Chris Van Hollen, U.S. Senator (Feb. 22, 2018), https://paaia.org/wp-content/up

loads/2018/03/Van-Hollen-Response-Letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/LD86-4MM6].
12
138 . Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).
113 Id at 2431 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Between Dec. 8, 2017 and Oct. 31, 2018, just six
percent of applicants were granted waivers, and ofthose, thirty percent had not yet received
them by early 2019. See Yeganeh Torbati, Exclusive: Only 6PercentofThose Subject to Trump
Travel Ban GrantedU.S. Waivers, REUTERS (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article
/us-usa-immigration-visas-exclusive/exclusive-only-6-percent-of-those-subject-to-trump-travel

-ban-granted-u-s-waivers-idUSKCN1RG30X [https://perma.cc/CPQ3-R928].
14 Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2433 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
15 Id at 2432-33.
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Department's implementation of the travel ban waiver process.1 6 There, the court

determined that plaintiffs had failed to state claims under due process and equal
protection.11 7 The court ruled that plaintiffs' allegations underlying those claims
were conclusory and likely subject to rational basis review.1 8 As in Hawaii, the
government proffered a national security justification, which the court took to
satisfy the requirement of a rational basis." 9 Similarly, plaintiffs had not alleged
deprivation of a fundamental right.12 0

Nonetheless, the plaintiffs succeeded in stating a claim under the APA and the
Accardi doctrine.1 2 1 The Accardi doctrine requires agencies to follow their own
procedures.12 2 The Emami court ruled that plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged that the
State Department failed to follow the procedures they announced on their website
for the adjudication ofwaivers, thus violating Accardi. 123 Specifically, plaintiffs had
alleged instances where they were denied further interviews or an opportunity to
submit documents demonstrating their eligibility for a waiver, contrary to the pro-

cedure outlined by the State Department.124
Other constitutional challenges to the waiver procedure have also faltered. In

Alharbi v. Miller, plaintiffs sought class certification for a group of U.S. citizens,
lawful permanent residents, and asylees who filed family visa petitions for Yemeni
national relatives and the relatives on whose behalf the petitions were filed.12 5
Plaintiffs contended thatthey were "issued" visas before the Proclamation, but the court
found that they were simply given a printed piece of paper, rather than an official

document. 126 As a result, they were not "issued" visas such that they could be grandfathered under the Proclamation's provision for those noncitizens who had been issued
visas prior to the date ofthe Proclamation. 127 Furthermore, the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to review the "consular officer's decision to revoke a previously
issued visa." 12 Applying Mandel and Hawaii,the court also viewed the Proclamation as a "facially legitimate and bona fide reason" for failure of visas to issue.12 9

See generally 365 F. Supp. 3d 1009 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
17 Id at 1022.
116

us Id

Id at 1023.
Id at 1022.
121 Id
at 1020.
122 Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 262-63 (1954); Thomas
W. Merrill, The
Accardi Principle,74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 569, 569 (2006).
123 Emami, 365 F. Supp. 3d at 1021.
124 Id
119
120

125
126

368 F. Supp. 3d 527 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
Id at 541, 553.

127 Id at 555.
128

129

Id
Id

at 562-63, 571.
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Plaintiffs further claimed a violation ofequal protection, relying exclusively on
Trump's anti-Muslim rhetoric.130 But the court determined that the bigoted statements alone did not constitute a "but-for" motive for the Proclamation, but rather,
might have been "in spite of' it. 131 Finally, the court determined that Hawaiiforeclosed the Establishment Clause claim. 13 2 Thus, the district court granted the government's motion to dismiss, finding plaintiffs' allegations "conclusory."

133

Other district courts have interpreted the Mandel standard to permit a more
rigorous review than that undertaken by the Alharbi court. In Arab-American Civil
Rights League v. Trump, the district court denied the government's motion to dismiss
plaintiffs' complaint challenging the Proclamation as a violation of the First Amendment's guarantee of speech, religion, and associational rights, and the equal protection

component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.134 The court ruled that
Mandelgoverned all constitutional claims, which required upholding any exclusion
decision based upon a "facially legitimate and bona fide" reason. 13 5Nonetheless, the
court concluded that plaintiffs' complaint sufficiently alleged violations under this
standard. 136 The court specifically rejected the government's contention that Hawaii
v. Trump mandated dismissal ofplaintiffs' claims; instead, the court emphasized that

the Supreme Court had considered only the highly limited factual record that had
developed in the dispute over issuance of a preliminary injunction. 137 At the motion

to dismiss phase, the court concluded that plaintiffs had stated a claim for relief.138
Similarly, in InternationalRefugee Assistance Project v. Trump, the district

court applied rational basis review to plaintiffs' constitutional challenge to the travel
ban Proclamation and denied the government's motion to dismiss based on Hawaii.139
The court observed that rational basis review, although deferential, has previously
led to the invalidation ofgovernment classifications. 4 Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged
uneven application of the national security criteria, suggesting that the criteria were
mere pretext. 141 In order to prevail, however, plaintiffs would have to refute the
government's national security rationale. 14 2
130

Id

at 563.

131 Id
at 564; see Shalini Bhargava Ray, PlenaryPowerandAnimus in ImmigrationLaw,
80 OHIO ST. L.J. 13, 19 (2019) (arguing for a but-for motive standard in this litigation). For
a recent discussion of "but-for" causation in civil rights law, see Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l

Ass'n Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1014 (2020).
132 Alharbi, 368 F. Supp. 3d at 561.
133 Id at 564.

399 F. Supp. 3d 717, 719 (E.D. Mich. 2019).
Id at 726 (quoting Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2419-20 (2018)).
136 Id at 728.
137 Id
138 Id at 729.
134

135

139

373 F. Supp. 3d 650, 660 (D. Md. 2019), rev'd, 961 F.3d 635 (4th Cir. 2020).

140 Id at 670 (discussing the animus cases).
141 Id at 674 (discussing pretext).
142 Id at 676.
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The Fourth Circuit ultimately rejected this conclusion in InternationalRefugee
Assistance Project, noting that the Supreme Court had already definitively determined that the most recent Proclamation bore some relationship to the stated national
security objectives. 143 It was no longer an open question whether the Proclamation

had some rational basis. Even ifthe Proclamation only obliquely related to the stated
objective, or even frustrated those objectives at some level, it was immune from
invalidation under rational basis review. 144 All that was required was some showing
of plausiblereasons, even if pretextual.

The ongoing challenges to the 2017 travel ban and its waiver procedure reveal district courts applying Mandel to constitutional claims and alternatingly exhibiting

great deference or, following the "animus" cases,"' allowing claims to proceed on the
notion that the disputed orders might fail even on rational basis review. 14 6 The Fourth

Circuit, however, does not view rational basis review as permitting a court to weigh
competing considerations: if the challenged law is based on plausible reasons, it
stands. 14 7 Apart from echoing this deferential approach to immigrants' constitutional

claims, cases like Emami also demonstrate that where constitutional claims might
fail, anAccardiclaim might succeed. These cases collectively demonstrate the limits
of constitutional rights in protecting immigrants' well-being as well as the promise
of relief based on challenges to agency process.

B. TemporaryProtectedStatus

Apart from banning the entry ofnoncitizens, the Trump Administration has also

sought to end lawful status for hundreds of thousands of immigrants already here.
In 2017, the administration ended TPS for immigrants from Haiti, Honduras, El
Salvador, Sudan, and Nepal. 14 8 Congress created TPS in 1990 in response to the
need to provide temporary lawful status to immigrants from countries that had

experienced natural disasters or war. 149 Congress further established a procedure for
143

Id

at 652.

144 Id at 651.
145 See William D. Araiza, Animus and Its Discontents, 71 FLA. L. REV. 155, 168-70

(2019); Ray, supra note 131, at 50.
146 Ray, supranote 131, at 48.
147 Id at62-63.
148 Kathryn Johnson & Peniel Ibe, Trump Has Ended Temporary ProtectedStatus for
Hundredsof Thousandsoflmmigrants. Here's What You Need to Know, AM. FRIENDS SERV.
COMM. (June 30, 2020), https://www.afsc.org/blogs/news-and-commentary/trump-has-ended
-temporary-protected-status-hundreds-thousands-immigrants [https://perma.cc/A87D-XDQR].
149 JILL H. WILSON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS20844, TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS:
OVERVIEWAND CURRENT ISSUES 2(2020). TPS shields certain noncitizens

from deportation,
authorizing them to work during their stay. INA § 244(b) explains eligibility:
The Attorney General, after consultation with appropriate agencies ofthe
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the designation and de-designation of affected areas. Specifically, the INA authorizes
the DHS Secretary to make an initial designation, and then provides for periodic
review after the initial designation, every sixty days.1 5 0 If the DHS Secretary determines that the foreign state previously designated "no longer continues to meet the
conditions for designation," they must publish a notice in the Federal Register explaining the basis for the determination.15 1 If the DHS Secretary wishes to extend the
designation, they may do so for a period of twelve or eighteen months.1 5 2 The Secretary's determination is conclusive and not subject to judicial review. 153 Over decades,
the INS and then DHS have followed a standard procedure for making designation

decisions namely, consulting with the State Department, the National Security
Council, and sometimes the Department of Justice.15 4
A wide range of community and legal organizations challenged the TPS terminations. The NAACP Legal Defense Fund brought suit to challenge the termination
of TPS for Haitians, alleging that the decision reflected racial animus rather than
objective review of country conditions.1 5 5 The Family Action Network Movement

Government, may designate any foreign state ...

under this subsection

only if
(A) The Attorney General finds that there is an ongoing armed
conflict within the state and, due to such conflict, requiring the return
of aliens who are nationals ofthat state to that state ... would pose
a serious threat to their personal safety;
(B) The Attorney General finds that
(i) There has been an earthquake, flood, drought, epidemic,
or other environmental disaster in the state resulting in a substantial, but temporary, disruption to living conditions in the
area affected,
(ii) The foreign state is unable, temporarily, to handle adequately the return to the state of aliens who are nationals of
the state, and
(iii) The foreign state officially has requested designation
under this subparagraph; or
(A) The Attorney General finds that there exist extraordinary and
temporary conditions in the foreign state that prevent aliens who
are nationals of the state from returning to the state in safety, unless
the Attorney General finds that permitting the aliens to remain
temporarily in the United States is contrary to the national interest
of the United States ....

Immigration and Nationality Act
" 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(3)(A).
151

152
153

Id
Id
Id

§ 244(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b).

§ 1254a(b)(3)(B).
§ 1254a(b)(3)(C).
§ 1254a(b)(5)(B).

154 TemporaryProtectedStatus:An Overview, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Jan. 20,
2020), https://

www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/temporary-protected-status-overview

[https://perma.cc/QK3S-9PAW].
155 See NAACP v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 364 F. Supp. 3d 568, 572 (D. Md.
2019);
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challenged the rescission of TPS for Haitians as well in the Saget case. 156 The
nonprofit Centro Presente challenged the termination on behalf of TPS recipients
from Honduras, El Salvador, and Haiti, alleging violations of equal protection and
due process. 15 7 Casa de Maryland sued on behalf of Salvadoran nationals, bringing

APA claims in addition to constitutional ones. 158 Finally, the ACLU brought suit on
behalf of TPS recipients from El Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Sudan, and their
U.S. citizen children. 15 9

All plaintiffs faced arguments that the courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over their claims.160 INA section 244(b)(5)(A) states: "There is no judicial review of

any determination of the Attorney General with respect to the designation, or termination or extension ofa designation, ofa foreign state under this subsection."6 1 Courts

have acknowledged that this precludes judicial review ofthe substantive designation
decision or the "content," but some have ruled that it does not preclude review ofthe
processby which the agency makes the decision.16 2 In addition, at least one court noted
that the provision did not preclude review of constitutional claims specifically.163
Plaintiffs in these lawsuits alleged a general pattern of DHS jettisoning longstanding practices regarding TPS designations and manipulating the process to obtain

a predetermined result to end TPS for tens ofthousands of Black and brown immigrants. According to plaintiffs in Saget, for example, DHS leadership manipulated
the longstanding re-designation process to force a recommendation for termination

of TPS for Haitians. 164 DHS initially designated Haiti for TPS in 2010 following a
devastating earthquake there. 165In 2017, plaintiffs alleged, United States Citizenship
and Immigration Services (USCIS) researchers initially determined that conditions
in Haiti warranted an extension of TPS, citing the earthquake's continuing effect on
Raymond Audain, Not Yet Forgivenfor Being Black: Haiti's TPS, LDF, and the Protean
StruggleforRacialJustice, 52 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 409, 412 (2019).
156 Saget v. Trump, 375 F. Supp. 3d 280, 328-29, 339 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (granting preliminary injunction).
157 Centro Presente v. Dep't ofHomeland Sec., 332 F. Supp. 3d 393,396 (D. Mass. 2018).
158
159

Casa de Md., Inc. v. Trump, 355 F. Supp. 3d 307, 312 (D. Md. 2018).
Ramos I, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1092-93, 1116 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (denying the govern-

ment's motion to dismiss), vacatedsub nom. Ramos II, 975 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2020).

See Saget, 375 F. Supp. at 330; NAACP v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 364 F. Supp. 3d at
574; Casa de Md, Inc., 355 F. Supp. at 316; Ramos I, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 1088; Centro
160

Presente, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 386. It appears that only the NAACP brought constitutional claims

alone. See generally NAACP v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 364 F. Supp. 3d 568. The other
plaintiffs brought constitutional claims as well as APA claims. See generally Saget, 375 F.

Supp. 3d 280; Casa de Md, Inc., 355 F. Supp. 307; Ramos I, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1075; Centro
Presente, 332 F. Supp. 3d 393.
161 Immigration and Nationality Act § 244(b)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. §
1254a(b)(5)(A).
162 Saget, 375 F. Supp. 3d
at 333.
163 NAACP v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 364 F. Supp.
3d at 575.
164 Saget, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 347.
165 Id
at 301.
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infrastructure, health, sanitation services, and emergency response capacity. 166 Plain-

tiffs alleged, however, that new US CIS appointees rejected this recommendation and
sought to build a record in support of termination. 167 They "directed staffers" to
revise the draft "to include an option for terminating TPS for Haiti."168 Ultimately,

USCIS circulated a draft memorandum recommending termination, concluding that
Haiti had "made significant progress in recovering from the 2010 earthquake" and
no longer warranted the TPS designation. 169 Thus, according to plaintiffs, the DHS

leadership pressed USCIS officials to launder their recommendation until it supported their preferred outcome.17 0
The procedural irregularities that characterized this process led the Saget court
to conclude that plaintiffs had alleged violations of the APA. Specifically, DHS's
failure to consider the currentstate ofHaiti, not merely conditions attributable tothe
2010 earthquake, departed from prior practice, and DHS had failed to supply a
"reasoned explanation" for the change in policy. 171 In addition, whatever review

process occurred was designed to build a case for a predetermined outcome. 172 Rather
than focusing on statutory factors such as earthquakes and dangerous conditions,

DHS focused on "crime rates and public benefit usage by TPS holders."17 3
Similarly, plaintiffs in Casade Maryland,Inc. alleged that the DHS Secretary's

decision-making process ignored the extensive factual record that had supported redesignation ofTPS for El Salvador eleven times from 2002 to 2016.174 The agency's
departure from its traditional approach to determining whether to re-designate a country

served as circumstantial evidence of racial animus. 175 The court in CentroPresente
determined that, based on documented procedural irregularities, plaintiffs had plausibly
alleged that the TPS designation decision was both "arbitrary and capricious" and
made "without 'observance of procedure required by law."' 176 Finally, in Ramos, the

court observed that the record supported the view that the White House influenced
166

Id

167 Id. at 315.
168 Id. at 305.
169 Id at 306.
170

See id. at 305-06, 372-74.

171 Id at354; see also Ramos I, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1105-08 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (on motion
for preliminary injunction, finding plaintiffs likely to succeed on APA claim due to agency's
failure to provide a "reasoned explanation" for its departure from a prior policy or practice
of considering "intervening conditions not directly related to the originating condition"),

vacatedsub nom. Ramos II, 975 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2020).
172 Saget, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 299.
173 Id
174 Casa de Md., Inc. v. Trump, 355 F. Supp. 3d 307, 312
(D. Md. 2018).
175 Nonetheless, the district court clarified that it lacked the authority to assess the merits
ofthe Secretary's termination decision it could only determine that plaintiffs had stated an
APA claim based on racial animus. Id. at 321.
176

Centro Presente v. Dep't ofHomeland Sec., 332 F. Supp. 3d 393, 416 (D. Mass. 2018).
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TPS decisions, with Acting Secretary Elaine Duke at one point attributing the
terminations to an "America first view." 177 Moreover, declarations by career DHS

employees revealed that the agency could arrive at a recommendation to terminate
TPS only ifit limited its consideration to those country conditions attributable to the
original event triggering the designation; thus, intervening conditions that would
justify a TPS designation according to the "standard metrics" would not be considered.1 78Agency officials further resisted staffrecommendations for extending desig-

nations, noting, "I do not think [this] is the conclusion we are looking for."

179

Allegations regarding a fundamental change in the nature of the TPS designation

process led district courts in these cases to find plausible claims of APA violations.
These courts also determined that plaintiffs had stated constitutional claims based
on Trump's "racial animus towards immigrants of color." 1 80 The Saget plaintiffs argued
that the evidence of racial animus triggered strict scrutiny of DHS's termination

decision, Trump v. Hawaiinotwithstanding. 181The district court agreed, noting that
the national security rationale so prominent in Hawaiiwas absent in this case, and

critically, that the noncitizens in question here were already present in the United
States.18 2 As a result, the reasons for Hawaii'sdeferential standard ofreview did not apply, and the court determined that a traditional equal protection analysis under
Arlington Heights was proper.18 3 Implicitly, the court regarded the plenary power doc-

trine as irrelevant outside of the regulation of entry or the national security context.
Other courts have similarly concluded that Trump v. Hawaiidoes not apply to
plaintiffs' constitutional claims. In Ramos, the court observed not only that the
government lacked a national security or foreign policy rationale for its TPS deci-

sion but that TPS beneficiaries have extensive ties to the U.S. that entitle them to
greater constitutional protection. 184 Many have lived in the U.S. for years. In addi-

tion to lengthy terms of residence, TPS beneficiaries often have U.S. citizen children, have obtained higher education in the U.S., and have had substantial careers
in the U.S.185 Thus, they enjoy more robust constitutional protection than a noncitizen seeking admission.186 Finally, in NAACP v. DepartmentofHomelandSecurity,
the district court declined to apply "deferential rational basis review." 18 7As inSaget,
177 Ramos I, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1100 (N.D. Cal. 2018), vacatedsub. nom. Ramos II,
975 F3d 872 (9th Cir. 2020).
178 Id at 1093, 1096, 1104.
179 Id at 1104.

180 Saget v. Trump, 375 F. Supp. 3d 280, 300 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
181 Id at 334-35; see alsoNAACP v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 364 F. Supp. 3d 568, 578
(D. Md. 2019).
182 Saget, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 301-02.
183 Id at 366.
184 Ramos I, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 1107; see alsoCentro Presente v. Dep't of Homeland
Sec.,

332 F. Supp. 3d 393, 411 (D. Mass. 2018).
185 Ramos I, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 1107.
186 See, e.g., id at 1107-08; Centro Presente, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 411.
187 364 F. Supp. 3d 568, 576 (D. Md.
2019).
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"

the district court in NAACP v. Departmentof HomelandSecurity determined that
Arlington Heights applied.18

Ultimately, every district court considering challenges to TPS terminations
permitted plaintiffs' constitutional claims to survive a motion to dismiss and, in at
least one case, also granted a preliminary injunction based on plaintiffs' likelihood
of success in establishing an equal protection violation.18 9 In NAACP v. Department
ofHomelandSecurity,the court ruled that the INA's jurisdiction-stripping provision

did not apply to constitutional challenges to the DHS Secretary's determination,9
and plaintiffs had plausibly alleged that the Acting DHS Secretary refused to
acknowledge evidence ofHaiti's troubled country conditions and failed to consider
all the statutory factors.191 Combined with the President's racial animus, the court
found that several factors supported a finding of discriminatory intent.1 9 2 In Ramos,

the district court determined that the Equal Protection Clause applied to executive
action in immigration law, and that the narrow review described in AADC applied
only to individual selective prosecution rather than programmatic challenges. 193
Similarly, Ramos found Rajah v. Mukasey distinguishable, despite the noncitizens'
presence in U.S. territory in that case, because the government had advanced a national
security rationale there, and the noncitizens at issue were otherwise deportable.19 4
Although TPS determinations are committed to the DHS Secretary's discretion,19 5
federal district courts ruling on the legality of the termination of TPS for several
countries have held that plaintiffs' specific claims were reviewable. 196 Courts have
noted that DHS's deviation from established procedure, combined with the President's rhetoric, supported an inference ofunconstitutional animus as well as a claim
for violation of the APA.197 These courts have concluded that an "amalgam of factors"
determine the constitutional status of particular noncitizens. 19 The presence or
absence of a national security or foreign policy rationale matters, but so do the

noncitizens' lawful presence in and ties to the United States.
188 Id On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the applicability of Arlington Heights but de"

termined that plaintiffs had "fail[ed] to present even 'serious questions' on the merits" by failing
to tie "the President's alleged discriminatory intent to the specific TPS terminations . ...

Ramos II, 975 F.3d 872, 897 (9th Cir. 2020).
189 See generally, e.g., Ramos I, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1075; CentroPresente, 332 F. Supp. 3d
393; Casa de Md., Inc. v. Trump, 355 F. Supp. 3d 307 (D. Md. 2018); Saget v. Trump, 375
F. Supp. 3d 280 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
190 364 F. Supp. 3d at 575.
191 Id
at 572-73, 578.
192 See id at 576-78.
193 Ramos I, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 1105-08.
194 Id at 1107-08.
195 See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2); Ramos I, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 1082; Heckler v.
Chaney, 470
U.S. 821, 835 (1985).
196 Ramos I, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 1090, 1104-05.
197 Id
198

IdatllO7.
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These early plaintiff victories, however, have proven fragile. In Ramos, for example, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction,

finding that none of plaintiffs' claims were likely to succeed. 199 The court determined that the APA claim was unreviewable and the equal protection claim failed
because plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that Trump had directly influenced the
TPS rescission decision.200
C. HumanitarianParole

The final set of cases I consider involves challenges to the administration's
decision to rescind humanitarian parole in individual cases as well as on a mass
scale. Humanitarian parole refers to "processes to allow entry or permission to

remain in the United States to those [who] do not otherwise qualify for admission." 201 Under INA section 212(d)(5)(A), the Attorney General has the discretion
to "parole" any noncitizen into the United States on a case-by-case basis "for urgent
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit." 202 The applicable regulation
permits parole of noncitizens with serious medical conditions, pregnant women,

juveniles, witnesses in U.S. proceedings, or those whose detention "is not in the
public interest" as determined by the DHS Secretary or their designees. 203
The Obama Administration created the Central American Minors program
(CAM) to permit minors from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to be consid-

ered for refugee resettlement in the U.S. while still in their home country. 204 If
deemed ineligible for resettlement, the minors were considered for humanitarian
parole, but the Trump Administration terminated this program in 2017.205 In S.A. v.
Trump, parents lawfully residing in the U.S. sued DHS and USCIS alleging that

termination oftheir beneficiary children's conditionally approved parole under the
CAM program violated the APA and the Equal Protection Clause. 206 The district
court viewed DHS's termination of the CAM Parole Program as two actions: 1)
terminating the Program going forward for new applicants, and 2) rescinding conditional approvals ofparole made prior to termination. 207

199
200

Ramos II, 975 F.3d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 2020).
Id

at 899.

201 ALISON KAMHI, LENA GRABER, ERIN J. QUINN, ALLISON DAVENPORT & JOSE MAGANASALGADO, PAROLE IN IMMIGRATION LAW
202
203
204

§

1.1 (1st ed. 2016).

Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A).
8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b)(5) (2020).
CentralAmericanMinors (CAM): InformationforParoleApplicants,U.S.CITIZENSHIP

& IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/humanitarian-parole/central-ameri
can-minors-cam-information-for-parole-applicants [https://perma.cc/3MTE-BXER] (June 18,

2019).
205 Id
206 363 F. Supp. 3d 1048 (N.D. Cal.
2018).
207 Id at 1077.
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The district court determined that plaintiffs had stated a claim challenging the
second action, but not the first. 208 It ruled that termination of the program going

forward satisfied the APA's requirement ofan adequate explanation because termination was consistent with Trump's desire to secure the border. 209 Unlike with the
termination of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), the court noted,
DHS terminated the program for policy reasons and took political responsibility for

it.2 In addition, DHS's legal interpretation of the parole statute lacked the flaws
tainting Secretary Nielsen's view ofDACA's purported illegality. 211 The courtnoted
that a parole termination was distinct from TPS termination as well, because the TPS
termination process involved a marked departure from past practice; here, the
termination of CAM parole did not involve a marked departure from past parole
terminations.12 Thus, the termination had a satisfactory explanation. 213

The court similarly rejected the notion that DHS had failed to consider "serious
reliance interests."21 4 USCIS told applicants that it would consider requests for
parole case-by-case, but it did not guarantee parole. 215 Similarly, the court found that
neither a liberal awarding of parole in prior cases nor the payment of application
fees creates a "serious reliance interest" in approval. 216 Nor did DHS's decision fail

to consider "important aspects of the problem," such as the conditions in Central
America, because the parole statute does not require DHS to consider such factors. 217
Plaintiffs succeeded, however, in stating a claim that DHS's rescission of conditional approvals en masse was arbitrary and capricious. 218 Plaintiffs alleged that the

government failed to consider serious reliance interests for those who were already
approved." 9 Although DHS has authority to rescind conditionally approved parole
applications, the only remaining steps for plaintiffs were entirely "nondiscretionary
ones: completion of a medical exam, final security checks, and making travel arrangements."220 Thus, participants approved for parole had serious reliance interests, and
DHS failed to explain why mass rescission was justified despite these interests.221
In contrast to the court's treatment of plaintiffs' APA claim regarding mass rescis-

sion, the court ruled that plaintiffs had not stated due process or equal protection
208 Id at 1096.
209 Id at 1080.
210

Id

at 1065-66.

211 Id at 1082.
212 Id at 1084.
213

Id

214 Id at 1087.
215 Id at 1086.
216

Id

217 Id at 1088.
218 Id at 1090.
219 Id at 1085.

Id at 1089.
221 Id at 1090, 1094.
220
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claims.222 First, plaintiffs lacked a protected liberty interest. 223 Unlike an immigrant
visa, parole created no statutorily created liberty interest. 2 24 With respect to plaintiffs' claim that mass rescission reflected racial animus toward Latino and Latina
immigrants, the court emphasized that plaintiffs' children had not yet entered the

U.S., thus entitling them to a less rigorous standard of judicial review.225 Citing
Trump v. Hawaii,the court noted that foreign nationals seeking entry lack a constitutional right of entry, and U.S. citizens do have rights of association, but this triggers
only a "circumscribed judicial inquiry." 2 2 According to the court, the Mandelstandard
asks whether the policy is "inexplicable by anything but animus." 22 7 In other words,
the court ruled that a policy will survive review under Mandel so long as animus is
not the sole motive. 228
The court regarded the termination of the CAM Parole Program as analogous

to the entry ban under review in Hawaii.229 It credited the government's view that
an over-generous use ofparole had contributed to the "border crisis" and that parole
should be used "sparingly and only in individual cases." 230 The court explicitly
attributed this conclusion to the deferential standard of review used in Hawaii,
noting that an argument about animus might have more weight in a challenge to the

termination of DACA or TPS, which "involve only individuals located in the United
States." 231 The court weighed heavily the noncitizens' absence from U.S. territory,
and the Mandel standard doomed plaintiffs' equal protection claim.232 Under the
"facially legitimate and bona fide" standard, the court was powerless to "test [government's] reasons [for terminating the CAM Parole Program] by balancing them against
the plaintiffs' constitutional interests." 233 S.A. offers an example ofa court applying

Mandeleven when the challenged policy lacks a national security rationale; instead,
the court applied Mandel because the noncitizens were not present on U.S. soil. 2 3 4
Courts considering other parole-related claims have similarly applied a deferential standard of review. In Gutierrez-Soto v. Sessions, petitioners sought a writ of

habeas corpus based on the Attorney General's revocation of their humanitarian
parole, allegedly in violation of their constitutional rights under substantive due
222 Id at 1093.
223 Id
224

225
226
227

228

Id
Id
Id
Id

at 1088.
at 1093.

See Verstein, supranote 81, at 1139 (describing the "sole motive" standard).

S.A., 363 F. Supp. 3d at 1093.
Id at 1064.
231 Id
at 1095.
232 Id at 1096.
233 Id
229
230

234 See Cristina M. Rodriguez, Trump v. Hawaii and the FutureofPresidentialPower

over Immigration, 2 AM. CONST. SOC'Y SUP. CT. REV. 161 (2018).
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process, equal protection, procedural due process, and the APA. 235 The district court
determined that it retained jurisdiction over petitioners' substantive due process
claim under Zadvydas v. Davis.236 However, it ruled that plaintiffs had not articulated
a violation of their rights. 237 Specifically, the court ruled that Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) had not violated petitioners' rights by initially granting them parole,

letting them work, live, and build a network for ten years, followed by abruptly apprehending and detaining them. 238 Similarly, the court determined that petitioners had
23 9
not suffered an equal protection violation based on Trump's anti-Mexican rhetoric.
The court applied Trump v. Hawaii and determined that petitioners' revocation of

parole could "be reasonably understood to result from a justification independent of
unconstitutional grounds." 24 Harsher immigration enforcement per se (revealed in
DHS policy changes) was not evidence ofnational origin discrimination. 241 Finally,

ICE emails showed that they targeted petitioners because their asylum claims failed,
not because of their national origin. 242
By downgrading the due process and equal protection rights ofplaintiff-parolees,

the district court revived a trend or theme in immigrants' rights jurisprudence that
weighs a formal admission heavily in evaluating the constitutional protection due
to a noncitizen. 243 Where the government does not advance a national security
rationale, noncitizens' presence in the U.S. typically enhances their constitutional
status. 244 Although the noncitizens denied parole in S.A. were located outside the
United States, the petitioners in Gutierrez-Sotowere already here. 245 Moreover, the
plaintiffs in Gutierrez-Soto alleged just the sort of "substantial ties" with the U.S.
that TPS beneficiaries described in their initially successful complaints. 246 And
although parolees have not been "admitted," they are present with the permission
of the United States. The district court appears to have weighed heavily the lack of
formal admission, overlooking the significance of a noncitizen's presence in the
United States. 247
See generally 317 F. Supp. 3d 917 (W.D. Tex. 2018).
Id at 925 (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688 (2001)).
237 Id
at 928-29.
238 Id
at 929.
239 Id at930-31.
240 Id
at 931 (quoting Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2419 (2018)).
241 Id
235
236

Id
243 See David A. Martin, GraduatedApplication of ConstitutionalProtectionsfor Aliens:
242

The Real Meaning ofZadvydas v Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 71 (arguing that immigrants'
rights jurisprudence weighs both a noncitizen's community ties and formal admission in
calibrating constitutional protection, thus putting parolees in an unfavorable position).
244 Id at 84.

CompareGutierrez-Soto, 317 F. Supp. 3d at 921-23, with S.A. v. Trump, 363 F. Supp.
3d 1048, 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
246 S.A., 363 F. Supp.
3d at 1067.
247 See id. at 1089-91.
245
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Surprisingly, given the court's dim view ofpetitioners' constitutional status and

AADC's general prohibition on selective deportation claims, the court ruled that
petitioners had stated a First Amendment claim. 248 As a journalist who criticized
ICE, petitioner was apprehended months after an event at the National Press Club,

thus establishing proximity between his expressive conduct and adverse action. 249
The court concludedthat "[d]rawing all reasonable inferences in favor ofPetitioners,
the evidence could establish that Respondents retaliated against immigrant activists
who criticized the government's policies."250 Thus, the court denied summary judgment on these claims.25 1
These humanitarianparole cases show the peril of Mandel for plaintiffs andthe
uncertain constitutional status of parolees, despite their presence within U.S.
territory and the lack of any national security rationale in terminating their status.
III. EMERGING LESSONS

Challenges to executive action in immigration law demonstrate the continuing
vitality of traditional administrative law claims amid mixed success for constitutional claims, and this, I argue, is partly the legacy of Trump v. Hawaii. Scholars have
characterized arbitrary and capricious review under the APA as more stringent25 2

and more flexible than rational basis review of constitutional claims. 253 That offers
one reason, pre-Hawaii, for the relative success of administrative law claims. But
the impact of Hawaii remains important and discernible. District courts have read
Hawaii to stand for the propositions that noncitizens who have not yet entered U.S.
territorylack constitutional rights and that the associational rights of U.S. citizens
in this setting are subject only to the mildest form of review.25 4 In addition, courts
have applied this mild review to noncitizens who have not been admitted, but who
are physically present.25 5 Instead, courts with this tepid view of immigrants' rights
248

Gutierrez-Soto, 317 F. Supp. 3d at 932-35; cf Michael Kagan,

When

Immigrants Speak:
The Precarious Status ofNon-Citizen Speech Under the FirstAmendment, 57 B.C. L. REV.

1237, 1268 (2016).
249 Gutierrez-Soto, 317 F. Supp. 3d at 933.
250 Id. at 934.
251

Id

252

See Metzger, supra note 106, at 484.
See Jennifer Lee Koh, When Shadow Removals Collide: Searchingfor Solutions to the

253

Legal Black Holes Created by ExpeditedRemoval andReinstatement, 96 WAsH. U. L. REV.

337, 383 (2018) (describing "fluidity" of arbitraryand capricious review).
254 See, e.g., Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 404 F. Supp. 3d 946, 951 (D. Md.
2019) ("Notably, courts that have been asked to consider the applicable standard since Hawaii
have read that opinion as calling for rational basis review of constitutional claims challenging
the Proclamation, such that there is likely not 'substantial ground for difference of opinion."'
(citations omitted)).
255 See Gutierrez-Soto, 317 F. Supp. 3d at 931.
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might understandably invoke reasoning more generally available when reviewing

an agency's final action. This Part elaborates on these observations and suggests a
direction for future exploration in litigation to protect immigrants' well-being-one
not premised on immigrants' rights.
A. The FirstLesson: The Primacyof OrdinaryAdministrativeLaw Claims

The first lesson of Hawaiiis the relative success of administrative law claims
over constitutional claims in challenges to executive action in immigration law. Some
of this follows from the relative strength of arbitrary and capricious review compared to rational basis review. Arbitrary and capricious review requires courts to
evaluate the process by which an agency makes a factual finding or discretionary
decision. Specifically, it calls for setting aside action unless there is a "rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made." 2 5 Although the relationship between the facts found and ultimate choice need not be particularly strong, an
agency cannot rely on post hoc rationalizations to explain its decision. 257 This pro-

hibition on post hoc rationalizations immediately distinguishes arbitrary and capricious review from rational basis review, the mildest form of constitutional scrutiny,
and one that thrives on hypothetical governmental purposes. 25
1. Reasons for the Judicial Preference for Ordinary Administrative Law Claims
Robust arbitrary and capricious review can serve as a meaningful check on
agency power when an agency uses an irregular process or fails to offer a sufficient

explanation for its action, but it does not on its own condemn substantively racist
policies. In Judulang, as noted in Section I.B, the Court determined that the BIA had
not adequately explained its reasons for relying on a meaningless distinction for limiting a form ofdiscretionary relief for noncitizens with certain criminal convictions.25
A similarly robust version of arbitrary and capricious review applied in Department
ofHomelandSecurity v. Regents of the University of California,discussed in Part
III below.260 There, the Court ruled that DHS had failed to consider "important aspects

ofthe problem" when rescinding DACA. 261 It had assumed without explanation that
both the work authorization and forbearance from deportation elements of DACA
should be rescinded to cure the purported illegality ofonly the former. 262 Procedural
256 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29,43 (1983) (quoting
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
257 Id
at 50.
258

See Steve Sanders, Making It Up:LessonsforEqualProtectionDoctrinefrom the Use and

Abuse ofHypothesizedPurposesin MarriageEqualityLitigation, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 657,659

(2017).
259 See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
260 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1901 (2020).
261
262

Id at 1912.
Id
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irregularities also dominated the analysis in the TPS litigation at the district court
level. 263 Except for the NAACP, plaintiffs in the TPS litigation raised both constitutional and APA claims, with both sets of claims emanating from what plaintiffs de-

scribed as the racist decision-making that plagued the TPS re-designation process. 264
Judges mightprefer to issue a ruling favorable to immigrants on administrative law

grounds rather than constitutional law grounds for several reasons. Professor Geoffrey
Heeren has noted that this approach allows judges to avoid intervening in an unsettled
area of the law, namely, immigrants' rights. 265 In addition, basing a decision on

ordinary administrative law errors permits judges to preserve a narrow institutional
role, to judge only the process rather than the substantive ends an agency chooses. To
brand an agency's decision or policy a violation ofequal protection on a vast record

of explicit animus, a judge would essentially have to condemn the policy itself. This
would involve straying from a purely procedural critique, even though engaging in

substantive analysis is the court's job when confronted with a constitutional claim. 266
Relatedly, judges might imagine a more straightforward remedy to an APA

violation compared to a constitutional one. On remand, the agency must go back and
weigh all the relevant considerations, and no irrelevant considerations, before
devising a policy. 267 In contrast, the remedy for an equal protection violation is more

fraught. What would the cure to a racist decision-making process look like? How
long after the President's utterance of hateful rhetoric, if ever, would the agency be
permitted to end TPS for maligned immigrants of color? These types of questions
plagued plaintiffs in Hawaiias well. 268 In the end, the Court dodged those issues by
ignoring the record of animus altogether. 269 For these reasons, courts may prefer to

resolve disputes on ordinary administrative law grounds.
The litigation over the rescission ofDACA illustrates the first lesson of Hawaii,
even though none of the Justices cited Hawaiiin their opinions resolving the case.
DACA was an Obama-era program that shielded certain noncitizens from deportation temporarily and provided them with work authorization. 270 The Trump Admin-

istration rescinded DACA in 2017 based on the then-Attorney General's view that
DACA was illegal from its inception.271 Plaintiffs challenged the rescission in multiple
263 Id at 1926-27.
264 See id at 1919-35.
265 Heeren, supra note 11, at 398.
266 See generallyGeorge Bach, Answering the "SeriousConstitutionalQuestion":Ensuring

MeaningfulReview ofAll ConstitutionalClaims, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 177 (2014).
267 See Vidal v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401, 420-21, 431-33 (E.D.N.Y.
2018), vacated
sub nom. Regents, 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020).
268 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 48-52, 54,
56-58, 60, 62-73, Trump v. Hawaii,
138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17-965).
269 See Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2392-93,
2417-18.
270 Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1901-02, 1918.
271 Press Release, Elaine Duke, Acting Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec., Rescission of

Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival (DACA) (Sept. 5, 2017).
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lawsuits filed across the country, asserting claims under the APA and the Equal
Protection Clause. 272District courts permitted lawsuits to move forward on both sets
of claims. 2 73 The Supreme Court ruled in the October 2019 term that the rescission

"was arbitrary and capricious" under the APA 274 but that plaintiffs had not adequately pled an equal protection claim based on Trump's anti-Mexican animus.275

With respect to the APA claims, the Court reasoned that Acting DHS Secretary
Elaine Duke's 2017 rescission memorandum cited one, and only one, reason for
rescission the Attorney General's view that DACA was illegal. 276 A subsequent
memorandum issued by Duke's successor, Acting Secretary Kirsten Nielsen, could

not be considered because it constituted a post hoc rationalization for Duke's decision. 2 77 Accordingly, the Court considered only Duke's memorandum and found
the justification for her policy choice lacking. 278 Under the APA, an agency has
discretion to make policy choices, but it must explain its reasoning adequately. 279
Citing State Farm, the Court further reasoned that an agency's decision is
arbitrary and capricious ifit "failed to consider . .. important aspect[s] ofthe problem." 280 Here, Duke was bound to accept the Attorney General's view that DACA
was illegal but that did not compel rescission. 2 1 Rather, the source ofthe illegality,
on the Attorney General's view, was the granting ofwork authorization and similar

benefits, not forbearance from deportation. 2 2 As a result, the Court reasoned, Duke
should have at least considereddecoupling benefits from forbearance; having not
even considered it, let alone explained why it was insufficient to meet the agency's
goals, Duke's decision was arbitrary and capricious. 283
Apart from her failure to consider an "important aspect of the problem" with respect to DACA's purported illegality, Duke further failed to consider DACA recipients'

reliance interests. 2 4 The Court conceded that those interests might not be particularly strong, given that DACA recipients were informed that the program could be
272 See Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1903; NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209, 215, 246
(D.D.C. 2018); Vidal, 279 F. Supp. 3d at 407.
273 Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1901-02, 1906-07, 1915-16; NAACP v.
Trump, 298 F. Supp.

3d at 215-16, 246; Vidal, 279 F. Supp. 3d at 407, 409, 438.
274 Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1912, 1915.
275 Id at 1906, 1915-16. The Court first held, as a threshold matter, that it hadjurisdiction
to review the challenge to the rescission.
276 Id at 1903-04.
277 Id at 1908-09.
278 Id at 1908-1.
279

Id

280 Id

at 1905, 1907-11, 1913, 1915.
at 1910-12, 1915 (alteration in original) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
281 Id
at 1910-13, 1915.
282 Id at 1910-12.
283 Id
at 1910-13, 1915.
284 Id
at 1913-14 (quoting State Farm,463 U.S. at 43).
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canceled at any time. 285 But regardless, many DACA recipients enrolled in higher

education, married their partners, and bought homes in reliance on DACA, and the
complete failure to consider those interests further undermined Duke's reasoning. 286
In contrast to its receptivity to plaintiffs' APA claim, the Court dismissed
plaintiffs' equal protection claim. 287 A plurality of Justices concluded that plaintiffs
had not adequately pled an equal protection claim, despite the President's campaign
rhetoric maligning Mexican immigrants, which is disproportionately the country of
origin for DACA recipients. 2 8 The Justices declined to decide the proper analytic

framework for this claim, but they ruled that even ifArlingtonHeights supplied the
correct framework, plaintiffs had not adequately pled a violation of equal protection. 289 First, most unauthorized immigrants are Latino; thus, "one would expect
them to make up an outsized share of recipients of any cross-cutting immigration
relief program."2 9 0 In addition, the Court did not recognize any irregularity in the

rescission process.291 Finally, the Court deemed Trump's animus "unilluminating"
because Acting Secretary Duke and the Attorney General, rather than Trump, were
the "relevant actors."29 2 Contesting each of these conclusions, only Justice Sotomayor
was convinced that plaintiffs had adequately pled that Trump's campaign rhetoric

constituted circumstantial evidence to show that racial animus motivated the
rescission of DACA. 2 93 The Court's DACA decision illustrates the relative success

of administrative law claims over constitutional ones, even for immigrants present
on U.S. soil.29 4 Although no Justice cited Hawaii, attorneys involved in the case
attributed the failure of the equal protection claim in part to a skepticism of immi295
grants' rights evinced in Hawaii.

285

Id

286 See id. at 1914-15.
287

Id

at 1915-16.

288 See id. at 1915-17.
289

Id

at 1915-16.

290 Id at 1915.
291

Id

at 1916.

292 Id Federal courts of appeal have taken note of the DACA majority's skepticism of
immigrants' equal protection claims. In Ramos II, described above in the discussion of TPS
litigation, the Ninth Circuit dismissed plaintiffs' equal protection claim, citing Regents. 975

F.3d 872, 898 (9th Cir. 2020).
293 Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1916-18.
294 See Frequently Asked Questions: DHS DACA FAQs, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-of-deferred-action-for-childhood
-arrivals-daca/frequently-asked-questions [https://perma.cc/9SPA-3K6D] (Feb. 4, 2021)
(noting that DACA recipients do not accrue unlawful presence while their removal has been
deferred, but DACA does not confer lawful status).
295 Amicus, Blockbusters: DACA and Title VII, SLATE, at 23:10-26:47 (June 20, 2020,
6:00 AM), https://slate.com/podcasts/amicus/2020/06/trump-bad-week-supreme-court [https://

perma.cc/5C59-L2WE].
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2. Implications of the Preference for Ordinary Administrative Law Claims

Courts' preference for administrative law claims bears some relationship to the
phenomenon identified by Professor Hiroshi Motomura of "phantom constitutional
norms" driving statutory interpretation in immigration law. 2 96 Thirty years ago,
Professor Motomura discerned the influence of"phantom norms" 297 on federal court

decisions in challenges to federal immigration statutes. In these cases, courts typically
faced a choice between openly deciding the constitutional question, which meant
following the plenary power doctrine and applying only the mildest scrutiny

if

any

to an immigration statute with harmful consequences for immigrants and
interpreting the statute in an immigrant-friendly way.298 Professor Motomura noted

that the resort to phantom norms stunted the development of immigrants' rights
jurisprudence but perhaps constituted a second-best solution in the shadows ofthe
plenary power doctrine.299

The use of phantom norms, however, differs from the constitutional avoidance
canon. That canon describes "a presumption that Congress does not intend to enact
unconstitutional legislation." 300 When faced with one interpretation that would
render a statutory provision unconstitutional and an equally plausible one that would
not, the court has the authority to choose the interpretation that does not present the
constitutional question. 301 This avoids invalidating a congressional enactment by
assuming that Congress would not have intended to violate the Constitution. 302 The
constitutional avoidance canon leads courts to protect potential constitutional interests
without expressly deciding their contours. 303 In contrast, under phantom norms, the
court reaches a decision contraryto what it would have reached had it followed the
plenary power doctrine. 304 As a result, under the phantom norms framework, the
court avoids a result that would harm immigrants' interests under constitutional law by
instead opting to interpret a statute in a manner that protects immigrants' interests.

296 See Hiroshi Motomura, ImmigrationLawAfter a CenturyofPlenaryPower: Phantom
ConstitutionalNorms andStatutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 549 (1990).
297

Id

at 564-65.

See id at 547-48.
299 See id at 564-67.
298

300

WILLIAMN. ESKRIDGE, JR., ABBE R.GLUCK &VICTORIA F.NOURSE, STATUTES, REGULA-

TION, AND INTERPRETATION: LEGISLATIONAND ADMINISTRATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF STATUTES

512 (2014).
301 Id
302 See id
303 The alternative would be to protect constitutional interests through an expressly
constitutional ruling that invalidates the statute in question.
304 Motomura, supra note 296, at 564-65. Motomura argues that the use of phantom
norms has stunted the development of jurisprudence on important questions, such as the
extent to which analytic frameworks from mainstream public law apply to immigration cases.
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This era of phantom norms driving sub-constitutional decisions to the benefit
ofimmigrants appears to have ended with decisions such as Jenningsv. Rodriguez 05

and Hawaii.'O In Jennings, the Supreme Court declined to invoke the canon of
constitutional avoidance to require bond hearings for certain detained noncitizens. 307
Similarly, inHawaii,the Court rejected statutory arguments and decided the Establishment Clause question to plaintiffs' detriment.3 08 As evidenced by these decisions,
greater openness in the adjudication of immigrants' rights has not been favorable to
immigrants.

Recent cases' deviation from the classic "phantom norm" cases serves as further
evidence that the "phantom norms" era has ended. Rather than "avoiding" deciding
constitutional questions, courts in the cases surveyed above take pains to articulate
a restrictive conception ofimmigrants' rights, one frequently upheld by the Supreme
Court.309 Ultimately, the preference for administrative law claims has contributed to
a crabbed vision ofimmigrants' rights by enabling courts to criticize agency process
while remaining silent on racial and religious discrimination.
B. The Second Lesson: GraduatedConstitutionalProtectionfor Noncitizens
Hawaiiand its progeny also reveal that immigrants enjoy "graduated constitutional protections," a phrase used by Professor David A. Martin to denote the varying

constitutional protection noncitizens enjoy based on their ties to the U.S., duration
ofresidence, and legal status.3 10 The district court decisions applying Hawaiireveal
a hierarchy among noncitizens, with those lawfully admitted into the U.S. and with

substantial ties to the U.S. at the top, and those outside of U.S. territory at the
bottom.311 In between, courts draw lines based on formal admission.3 12 Recent cases
have also evinced this "positivis[t]" turn, emphasizing legal status.313
The only class of cases discussed above in which immigrants routinely succeeded
in advancing constitutional claims at the district court level involved challenges to
the rescission of TPS. Immigrants with TPS have been formally admitted and are

lawfully present on U.S. soil. In contrast, courts applied only the mildest scrutiny
to claims brought by noncitizens who were not present on U.S. soil, as in challenges
to the travel ban and its waiver procedure and the S.A. humanitarian parole case.314
305 See

138 S. Ct. 830, 836 (2018).

306

See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2392-93 (2018).

307

Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 836.

308

Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2392-93, 2407-08, 2422-23.

309 See generally id.; Jennings, 138 S. Ct. 830.
310
311
312

See Martin, supranote 243, at 48-49, 84-85, 89, 137.
See, e.g., Saget v. Trump, 375 F. Supp. 3d 280, 367-68 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
See, e.g., Yafai v. Pompeo, 924 F.3d 969, 973-74 (7th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (explain-

ing that denial of a visa does not require reasoning).
313 See Martin, supranote 243, at 97-99; see also, e.g., Saget, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 367-68.
314

See, e.g., S.A. v. Trump, 363 F. Supp. 3d 1048, 1091-92 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
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This mild scrutiny applied also to claims brought by those who were present, but who
had not yet been admitted, as in Gutierrez-Soto. 15 With the Court's recent decision
in Thuraisiggiamas well, where the Court deemed an asylum seeker who had crossed
into the U.S. without having been admitted lacking a right to due process, 316 the role
of formal admission in determining constitutional status has only grown.3 17
Uncertainty surrounding immigrants' constitutional rights partly drove the
phenomenon of"phantom norms" discussed above. 318 But with greater openness in

adjudication producing more anti-immigrant rulings, the uncertainty has yielded to
a new doctrinal landscape, one in which most noncitizens are weak rights-holders,
at least with respect to the First Amendment and the equal protection guarantee
implicit in the Fifth Amendment. 319 For any noncitizen who is not or who never has

been a legal permanent resident, or formally admitted into some other status, the Bill
of Rights now offers very little.
Other avenues for vindicating immigrants' interests and promoting their well-

being merit consideration. Traditional administrative law claims offer some hope,
as evidenced in the DACA, humanitarian parole, and waiver litigation.3 2 0 But an

APA victory does not condemn bigotry the way an equal protection victory would,
if at all.3 21 In addition, as Professor Heeren has argued, ordinary administrative law
victories offer mild and mercurial protection.3 2 2 They make immigrants' interests
more a matter of executive whim, for an immigrant-protective policy and an antiimmigrant policy can each be arbitrary and capricious.3

23

As a result, APA claims

may prove insufficiently protective of immigrants' interests.

As immigrants' constitutional claims receive mild or uneven scrutiny, advocates
might consider a renewed focus on citizens' interests. Currently, citizens' right to
See, e.g., Gutierrez-Soto v. Sessions, 317 F. Supp. 3d 917, 927-30, 932-33 (W.D. Tex.
2018).
316 Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1964 (2020) (holding that a
315

noncitizen had "no entitlement to procedural rights other than those afforded by statute" when
he "attempted to enter the country illegally and was apprehended just 25 yards from the border").
317 With respect to DACA recipients, many of whom had been admitted at some point in
their childhood, the Court appeared to view ArlingtonHeights as the proper framework, thus
suggesting that traditional equal protection review would apply, even ifplaintiffs' equal protection claim failed in that particular case. Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ.

of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1914-16 (2020).
318 See Motomura, supranote 296, at 549.
319 This raises a more general problem, one recently explicated
by Hiroshi Motomura,
with reliance on a civil rights lens to confront the big questions of migration today. Hiroshi
Motomura, The New MigrationLaw: Migrants, Refugees, andCitizens in an Anxious Age, 105

CORNELL L. REV. 457, 458-60, 464-66, 471 (2020).

See supra Part II.
Sinnar & Srikantiah, supra note 80, at 206-07.
322 See Heeren, supranote 11, at 418.
323 See id at 426.
320
321
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associate with noncitizens located outside U.S. territory is protected weakly.3 24 But
the freedom of association is underappreciated and underdeveloped in many domains,
including immigration law. Scholars and advocates might consider developing arguments rooted in the freedom of association as well as citizens' substantive due process
rights of U.S. citizens to cohabit with noncitizen family members. At least a few
Justices and federal judges endorsed this sort of argument in Kerry v. Din.3 25 Such
3 26
an approach also coheres with trends in international law and human rights law.

Straying from a civil rights framework, immigrants' rights advocates might also

explore structural constitutional claims, such as a claim arising under the Take Care
Clause of Article II.327 Complete development of this idea is beyond the scope of
this Article, and the justiciability of such a claim is unclear, but a few key points
merit discussion. At the most basic level, the Take Care Clause imposes on the
President a duty to "take Care that the laws be faithfully executed."3 2 On one view
of this duty, the duty to faithfully execute the laws implies a duty of good faith,
which the President violates when he acts out of racial animus. 329 Under this approach, even if a person subjected to a presidential order lacks equal protection

rights, the Constitution imposes a structural constraint on the President nonetheless.
CONCLUSION

This Article assesses the emerging lessons of Trump v. Hawaiiand concludes that
the decision has dampened plaintiffs' success in litigating constitutional claims in
a range of challenges to executive action in immigration law
324

even for immigrants

See Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CALIF. L. REV.

373, 391-92 (2004).
325

See 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141-42 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing freedom of

association as a liberty interest with procedural due process protections); Din v. Kerry, 718

F.3d 856, 868 (9th Cir. 2013), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 2128.
See Annalisa Ciampi (Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful
Assembly and of Association), Rights to Freedom ofPeacefulAssembly andofAssociation,
326

5-6, 8, 12, 14, 18, U.N. Doc. A/72/150 (July 14, 2017) (arguing for freedom of association
to be considered a fundamental human right); Edison Lanza (Special Rapporteur for Freedom
of Expression on the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights), Protestand Human
Rights: Standards on the Rights Involved in SocialProtestandthe Obligation to Guide the

Response of the State, 11-13, 16, 48, 70, 79, OEA/Ser.L/V/II (September 2019) (discussing
the importance of freedom of association when applied to protests).
327 See Evan D. Bernick, Faithful Execution: Where Administrative Law Meets the

Constitution, 108 GEO. L.J. 1, 1, 4-5 (2019).
328 U.S. CONST. art. II, §
3.
329 See Bernick, supranote 327, at 53 ("Not every deviation from perfect enforcement of
the laws is constitutionally problematic. But both individualized nonenforcement decisions
and general non-enforcement policies must be based on contextually legitimate reasons, rather
than favoritism, animus, or policy disagreement with a statute that the President does not deem
constitutionally objectionable.").
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present within U.S. territory and in cases not implicating national security interests.

For reasons that predate Hawaii,courts tend to privilege administrative law claims
over constitutional ones in immigration law. But Hawaiihas intensified that trend
by calling into question immigrants' constitutional status and courts' capacity to
remedy equal protection violations in an area where the government typically enjoys

wide latitude.33 OIn addition, district courts interpreting Hawaiiappear to be implementing the idea of graduated constitutional protection for noncitizens, but hewing
too closely to formal distinctions. This dim view of immigrants' rights ignores the
substantial harm that citizens suffer, even when noncitizens lack robust rights. It also
overlooks potential structural constitutional violations. Both avenues deserve greater
attention in the years ahead.
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